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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
DEBRA LARECE ARANDA, : Case No. 20000720-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE 
RELEVANT TO ARANDA'S COMPULSION DEFENSE. 
A. Aranda Presented Sufficient Evidence of Her Compulsion Defense to 
Be Entitled to the Defense as a Matter of Law. 
The State initially asserts that Appellant Debra Larece Aranda ("Aranda") failed 
as a matter of law to present prima facie evidence of her compulsion defense and, 
therefore, other excluded evidence was irrelevant. See_State's Brief ("S.B.") at Point I. 
Accordingly, the State maintains that the trial court was not in error in excluding such 
evidence. Id 
The State's argument was not adequately preserved below since it did not argue in 
the trial court that Aranda failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant a jury 
instruction on her compulsion defense. See generally 359-61: see State v. Bryant 965 
P.2d 539, 546 (Utah App. 1998) (quotation omitted) ("'[t]rial counsel must state clearly 
and specifically all grounds for objection'"). Absent a proper objection below, the trial 
court was denied the opportunity to address the issue and make explicit findings in 
defense of its decision to submit a compulsion defense instruction to the jury based on its 
advantaged position to assess the facts and the credibility of witnesses. The State 
likewise fails to assert any exception to the preservation rule that would make appellate 
review appropriate. See, e.g.. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah App. 1996), cert denied 
931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997) (noting three exceptions to preservation rule: (1) plain error, 
(2) exceptional circumstances, and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel). Accordingly, 
the State's argument that Aranda was not entitled to the compulsion defense is waived. 
Moreover, the State's argument is unfounded. As an initial matter, the trial court 
obviously found that there was plenty of evidence to submit the question to the jury since 
it gave such an instruction. R.257 (Instruction No. 354). A trial court's factual findings 
concerning the propriety of a compulsion defense instruction shall not be disturbed 
absent clear error. See State v. Ott. 763 P.2d 810, 812 (Utah App. 1988). 
The giving of the instruction is consistent with State v. Knoll. 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 
1985), cert, denied 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). Knoll instructs that an affirmative 
defense (in that case, self-defense) may either be established by the prosecution's 
evidence or the defendant's evidence. IcLat 214. The Supreme Court expressly stated 
that "a defendant is not required to establish a[n affirmative] defense . . . beyond a 
reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. There need only be 
"some reasonable basis" in the evidence to acquit a defendant, let alone submit the 
question to the jury. Id. 
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The evidence Aranda presented to the court in support of the compulsion defense 
is as follows: Aranda, Greg Myers ("Myers") and John Hender ("Hender") went to the 
apartment of Honorio Garcia ("Garcia") and Norma Rosales ("Rosales"). R.360[37]. 
Hender wanted to meet Garcia so that he could buy drugs from him, and Aranda agreed to 
introduce them. R.360[38]. 
While talking, Hender became agitated and eventually pulled a knife on Garcia. 
R.360[42]. Aranda asked Hender what he was doing. R.360[43]. He ordered her to 
search for drug money and valuables in the apartment. Id. Aranda testified that she 
considered running away at that point, but decided not to because she feared Hender and 
feared for the safety of Garcia, Rosales and their children who were in the apartment. 
R.360[43,60]. 
Aranda went into a bedroom where Rosales and the children slept. R.360[43]. 
Aranda told Rosales that the man in the living room wanted money. R.360[44]. Rosales 
did not understand Aranda because she did not speak English. Id. Aranda opted to take 
some jewelry that was in a box because she was nervous about returning to Hender 
empty-handed. R.360[44]. Under Knoll this evidence is sufficient to provide "some 
reasonable basis" for Aranda's compulsion defense. 712 P.2d at 214. Consequently, 
contrary to the State's assertion, Aranda was entitled to the compulsion defense as a 
matter of law. Id. at 215. 
The State also makes the unpreserved claim that Aranda was not entitled to the 
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compulsion defense as a matter of law because she did not establish a "'specific threat"' 
in support of her compulsion defense. S.B.19. Contrary to the State's position, the 
evidence does support the inference of a threat definite enough to submit the compulsion 
defense to the jury. The evidence noted by the State in its brief alone establishes that 
Aranda was "coerced [to act] by the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical 
force upon [her] or a third person[, i.e. Garcia, Rosales, or their young children] which 
force or threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in [her] situation would not 
have resisted." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302(1) (1999) (Compulsion Defense): that 
Aranda was "surprised when Hender grabbed a knife from the dish drainer and held it to 
Honorio. When she asked Hender what he was doing, he went 'like that' with the knife, 
and said, 'You go find the rest of his drug money and stereos and whatever.' R.360:43," 
SB. 21; that Hender told Aranda to "'shut up and go find the rest of the dope money.' 
[R.360:60,]" SB 21; that although Hender did not expressly threaten Aranda, Garcia or 
Rosales, she instinctually knew to do what he said because she feared both Hender and 
Myers, SB 21; and that Aranda testified to a "menacing knife gesture." SB 21; see also 
supra (discussing evidence in support of prima facie case of compulsion). 
The detail and extent of such evidence establishes a clearly implied, if not express, 
threat and distinguishes the present case from the case law cited by the State regarding 
the requisite specificity of a threat in compulsion defense cases. First, it must be noted 
that a "specific threat" is not expressly required by the compulsion defense statute. See. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302. Rather, requiring a specific threat is the result of judicial 
interpretation of the compulsion defense statute as it is applied in the specific context of 
various offenses. See, e.g. State v. Ott. 763 P.2d 810, 812 (Utah App. 1988) (in theft 
context, "defendant must be faced with a specific, imminent threat of death or serious 
bodily injury"); State v. Turtle, 730 P.2d 630, 634 (Utah 1986) (quoting State v. Harding. 
635 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1981)) (in escape context, evidence must have the "'specificity 
which is necessary to establish the existence of an immediate threat'"). 
Utah case law is silent as to the requisite specificity of a threat in the context of a 
robbery and kidnapping charge. However, the detailed evidence presented by Aranda is 
more than adequate to establish the validity of the threat here when viewed in light of 
related case law. In Harding, an escape case, the Supreme Court held that the defendant 
was not entitled to an instruction on the defense of compulsion for lack of a specific 
threat because the threat that defendant complained of occurred "approximately one 
month before his escape. There is nothing in the record to show that there was any more 
of a threat against him on the particular day of his escape than there had been during any 
one of the days which had elapsed since the occurrence of the incident." 635 P.2d at 35. 
Moreover, the testimony of the other co-defendants did not otherwise establish a more 
definite or specifically detailed sort of threat. Idj see also Ott, 763 P.2d at 812 
(insufficient evidence of specified threat in theft case where testimony established only 
that defendant was threatened with bodily injury, but evidence did not establish details). 
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The State additionally argues despite inadequate preservation that Aranda is not 
entitled to a compulsion defense as a matter of law because she placed herself in 
circumstances where she would be subject to duress, SB 22; see also Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2-302(2); and because she committed the independent, uncoerced act of stealing 
jewelry from Garcia and Rosales. SB 23. Although Aranda admitted that she took 
Hender and Myers to the Garcia/Rosales residence to facilitate their future drug-buying 
relationship, this does not necessarily imply that the ensuing exchange was going to be so 
dangerous and volatile as to be obviously coercive under § 76-2-302(2). Small time drug 
transactions where people are buying small quantities for their own use typically are not 
violent. See Wayne R. LeFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise On the Fourth 
Amendment § 9.5(a), at 254-60 (noting that large scale drug deals, as opposed to small 
transactions, are almost always violent in nature). They happen many times on a daily 
basis without incident in most major metropolitan areas like Salt Lake City. Accordingly, 
someone like Aranda may make an introduction between a perspective buyer and seller 
without "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly" placing herself in a situation where she 
might be compelled to partake in a crime. Utah Code Ann. §76-2-302(2). 
The fact that Aranda ended up taking jewelry likewise does not disqualify her 
from asserting a compulsion defense. The State cites Farrell v. Turner, 482 P.2d 117, 
120 (Utah 1971) for the proposition that a defendant cannot commit an independent 
criminal act and still claim that another person coerced her to do so. SB23. Farrell has 
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no application here because it was decided under an entirely different coercion statute 
providing that women were not capable of committing a crime if "acting under the .. . 
coercion of their husbands." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-41 (1953 as amended). The 
Supreme Court noted the absurdity of that statute yet applied it since it was still in effect 
at the time of the case. Farrell 482 P.2d at 120. The statute has since been repealed and 
is expressly denounced in subsection (3) of the current compulsion defense statute, which 
states, "[a] married woman is not entitled, by reason of the presence of her husband, to 
any presumption of compulsion or to any defense of compulsion except as in Subsection 
(1) provided." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302(3). 
To the extent that Farrell may be instructive in the compulsion defense context, it 
is distinguishable from the case at bar. In that case, the defendant was told by her 
husband, who was incarcerated, to "break into the jail, get the keys, and unlock the 
doors, and that if she did not do it he would be in prison for 20 years." Farrell 482 P.2d 
at 120. Instead, she gave him "hacksaw blades so he could break out." IJL In declining 
to accept her defense, the Supreme Court stated, "[e]ven if she had been coerced by her 
husband, she departed from his coercion and committed an entirely different crime of her 
own choosing." Id. 
Arandafs case is different. Aranda testified that Hender gestured with a knife and 
said, "f[y]ou go find the rest of his drug money and stereos and whatever.'" R.360[43]. 
Hence, fearing for her own safety and that of Garcia, Rosales and their children, she took 
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whatever she could find in the heat of the moment, which was jewelry, because she could 
not find anything else that she thought would satisfy Hender. R.360[44,60]. Such action 
fell well within the ambit of Hender's order under the circumstances. It was not a 
departure from Henderfs coercion such that the duress was dispelled in this instance. See 
Farrell. 482 P.2d at 120. 
B. The State Improperly Argues Waiver Concerning Aranda's Discussion 
of Rules of Evidence 404 and 801. 
i. Rule 404 
The State asserts that Aranda's discussion of Utah Rule of Evidence 404 (2000) is 
improper for lack of preservation. SB 25. The State misapprehends Aranda's argument 
on appeal. Aranda asserted that the excluded evidence was admissible under Rule 405(b) 
(2000) in the trial court thereby preserving that issue for appeal. R.281,360[28,32-33]; 
see also Bryant. 965 P.2d at 546 (discussing preservation). The State countered that the 
evidence was inadmissible under Utah Rules of Evidence 608, 609, and 404(a) and -(b). 
R.360[26]. Aranda consistently maintains on appeal that the excluded evidence is 
admissible under Rule 405(b). However, as noted in her opening brief that "Utah law is 
silent as to the application of Rule 405(b) in the context of defendants proffering 
testimony to support a compulsion defense." AB 18. Hence, Aranda made an analogy to 
Rule 404(b) jurisprudence in that context as a helpful guide to an analysis under Rule 
405 (b). AB 18-21. This does not mean that she has raised an unpreserved issue on 
appeal. In fact, appellate courts routinely look to analogous contexts to address specific 
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issues that are otherwise unaddressed in case law. See, e.g., Buczvnski v. Industrial 
Comm'n of Utah, 934 P.2d 1169, 1174 (Utah App. 1997) (looking to analogous legal 
contexts in adopting "continuous coverage rule" in worker's compensation cases); see, 
e.g.. State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 194 (Utah 1988) (Durham, J., concurring) (noting 
relationship between Rule 404 and 405 as they concern character evidence and specific 
instances of conduct). 
It bears mentioning, however, that to the extent that the State posited a Rule 
404(b) counter argument below to the trial court, the same analysis would be adequately 
preserved for appeal. "One of the primary reasons for imposing waiver rules like rule 
103(a)[] is to assure that the trial court has the first opportunity to address a claim that it 
erred. If the trial court already has had that opportunity, the justification for rigid waiver 
requirements is weakened considerably." State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 
1991). Hence, given that the State put a Rule 404(b) issue before the trial court and it 
therefore had the "first opportunity to address [the] claim," the State's waiver argument is 
meritless. Id. 
ii. Rule 801 Hearsay 
The State's waiver argument concerning Aranda's discussion of Utah Rule of 
Evidence 801(c) is without merit as well. The trial court excluded the evidence 
concerning Hender and Myers as inadmissible hearsay. R.360[31-35]; see also Rule 801 
(hearsay). To the extent that the trial court premised its ruling on this basis, it is within 
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the bounds of permissible argument on appeal. The purposes of the preservation rule are 
not subverted in discussing Rule 801(c) since the trial court had the "first opportunity to 
address [the] claim." Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1161. 
Moreover, as with the analysis under Rule 404(b), Aranda's discussion of Rule 
801(c) is merely incidental to her main argument, which is that the evidence should have 
been admitted under Rule 405(b). See.AB 18-21. It is not the basis of her issue on 
appeal. Therefore, it may appropriately be discussed in her opening brief. Consequently, 
the State's waiver argument is misapplied in this instance. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing and based on the arguments set forth in her opening brief, 
Aranda respectfully requests this Court to reverse her convictions and remand her case to 
the trial court.1 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this S^ day of November, 2001. 
CATHERINE E. LILLY U 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
1
 Aranda submits on her opening brief to the State's arguments that are not 
specifically addressed herein. 
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